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Abstract 
This paper deals with an apparent gap in the higher education finance literature. The risk of 
individual and social investment in higher education is not a well-researched topic compared 
to, for example, the rate of return to education investment; however, some authors strongly 
suggest that a student loan market bubble will be behind a new economic crisis. The tuition 
fees and debt balance is growing at a rapid pace. In many countries tuition fees are low, but 
there is a possibility to borrow for investment in education. This can lead to irresponsible 
investment behaviour. The paper will conclude that the student loan market is too small to 
cause a macroeconomic crisis, but that it is a market with many stakeholders and irresponsible 
behaviour should not be allowed. With the examination of a Hungarian sample, it can be 
concluded that in a situation where rational investment behaviour might not be expected in the 
context of higher education, signs of rational investment behaviour can be found. The risks of 
post-secondary studies are not yet fully understood and measured, and for this reason 
suggestions for further research will be made.  
Keywords: Economics of Education, Higher Education Finance, Student Loan, Income-
Contingent Loan,  
JEL: G15; I22  
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1. Introduction 
Human capital accumulation is an important factor behind economic growth. For this reason 
human capital investment has long been a debated topic in the economic literature. 
Approaching the workers in a company as some kind of capital can be dated back to Adam 
Smith; however, the works of a theoretical school led by Shultz and Becker laid the 
foundation for a human capital investment theory. There are several questions at issue, from 
human capital measurement through labour market information asymmetries to human capital 
investment constraints. This paper contributes to the discussion on the risk of individual 
human capital investment. The basic idea is that individuals are willing to spend time and/or 
money to invest in their own human capital because it will make them more valuable workers, 
among many other advantages, so they can earn more in the future. The cost of human capital 
are foregone earnings and monetary costs. The yield can be, for instance, a wage advantage 
because of enhanced productivity. It is a financial investment decision, particularly because 
human capital investment through higher education is a long term investment and getting a 
degree can take 3, 5 or even more years. It is not easy to predict what will be the wage for a 
given qualification, or whether there will be any demand for it on the labour market. 
Moreover, individual features can cause cycles in earnings. We can consider education a risky 
financial investment. In the empirical literature review section the theoretical consequences of 
such a line of thought will be introduced.  
An environment of agents making risky investments can create interesting scenarios. If they 
underestimate risks, and the investment is relatively cheap1 this can lead to investment 
bubbles and eventually to a crisis. Some suspect that this is exactly what is going on in the 
student loan market. The argument laid out in the press by writers such as Davies-Harrigan 
(2012), McCluskey (2013) or also in the Hungarian press (PSZO, 2012) is the following: 
American student loans, like the main lending mechanisms such as Stafford and Perkins 
loans, are federal loans; the government is creating a bubble by allowing easy access to 
student loans, which has the effect of growing tuition fees. Higher tuition fees demand higher 
lending which in turn creates higher tuition fees. Eventually this will lead to a situation in 
which graduate borrowers will be unable to pay back their debt and the government will be 
left with a huge uncovered amount outstanding. That is a sure recipe for a debt crisis. 
                                                          
1 For instance if one has to choose between a high chance of unemployment with low possible wage 
offers and a currently low-interest rate student loan and easy education, the second option might be 
very tempting but will not have a high return.   
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This is not only an overseas phenomenon. The recent global economic crisis had a severe 
impact on the Hungarian economy that led to years of stagnation. It was one of the reasons 
behind the government’s need to intervene in the status quo of the Hungarian higher 
education system. Most students recently starting in such fields as economics or law must pay 
a full cost contribution. To aid this change in the costs of education a new student lending 
vehicle was introduced (Balogh et al, 2012), called Diákhitel 22.  
People all are spending more3 on risky investments in human capital. Is this something similar 
to an expansion of a bubble that will eventually lead to a crisis? If a higher education crisis 
happens, will it be similar to the recent US housing market correction? Can it be a trigger for 
a macroeconomic setback? 
This paper approaches these questions from two directions. First, it will consider whether the 
market is big enough where it is the most expected to have a domino effect in the whole 
economy. Second, we will ask whether the investors can be considered financially reasonable, 
where they are the least expected to be. By financial rationality we understand a behaviour 
which chooses higher risk only when it is rewarded by a higher return. The empirical section 
will introduce results from a Hungarian sample. The education programs chosen by the 
sample can be fitted to an equation that derives from the financial theory of the efficient 
frontier. 
The paper will conclude that even where the higher education market size is huge, the 
numbers are not high enough to be considered as a potential risk factor. Moreover, rational 
financial behaviour patterns will be found where they are least expected. Combining the two 
conclusions means that human capital investment market growth is not a macroeconomic 
threat. The results will even suggest that the deterrent effect of the risk might not be the most 
interesting microeconomic problem. 
This research was supported by the European Union and the State of Hungary, co-financed by 
the European Social Fund in the framework of the TÁMOP-4.2.4.A/ 2-11/1-2012-0001 
‘National Excellence Program’. 
                                                          
2 However, its popularity failed to live up to the expectations, as was pointed out by the following 
article: http://hvg.hu/karrier/20121210_diakhitel_2 
3 Both their current and future capital. 
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2. Literature Review 
Becker (1964) gave examples, theoretical background and the tools to calculate the rate of 
return to education, and since then it has been a very popular topic in the literature (see 
several literature reviews and empirical works by Psacharopoulos, such as Psacharopoulos 
(1995) or Psacharopoulos – Patrinos (2004)). The basic idea was that investment in education 
is no different from financial investments from the point of view of decision-making. The 
value of the investment is the net present value of the cash-flows generated by it, and the rate 
of return is where the net present value is zero. Some of the more interesting findings are that 
the rate of return is exceptionally high (more than 10%), and in some cases this does not 
diminish with a higher level of education, which basically means the more we invest the 
higher rate of return we experience; moreover, the social return is usually positive as well (T. 
Kiss, 2010). 
The risks of education investment have also been studied since the early 70’s. There are some 
theoretical papers with important insights (Levhari, D. – Weiss, Y. 1974, Eaton – Rosen 1980, 
Hamilton, J. H. 1987, Anderberg – Andersson, 2003; da Costa – Maestri 2007; Anderberg 
2009; Jacobs et al, 2009) and some very useful empirical literature (Carniero et al, 2003, 
Cunera et al, 2004; Chen, 2008). There is a debate over whether we should consider education 
a risky investment in human capital or as an insurance against labour market risks.  Chen 
(2008) finds that the divergence from the expected return for education was unforeseeable for 
the cohort he examined. This means it cannot be traced back to family background, or 
individual features. Consequently, we cannot predict if someone will be better or worse off 
with a degree than the average degree holder. Hillman (2014) published a study dealing with 
the fact that students with low-incomes and from minority backgrounds have a 
disproportionally high chance of defaulting on their student loan. This constitutes a risk. 
However, Anderberg – Anderson (2003) pointed out that degree holders have better labour 
market statistics, a lower unemployment rate, higher expected earnings, and better health 
conditions. In this sense the degree is an insurance, although it should be added that it is not 
an automated insurance like car-insurance. For example, if one is involved in a traffic 
accident the car insurance company automatically pays for the damage if current conditions 
are met. That is automated insurance. However, there is no contract or policy that makes it 
certain if an individual becomes unemployed he will get a job earlier than somebody without 
a degree. There has been no unarguable answer to this debate; however, some contributions 
will be made in this paper.  
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Before we turn to that issue, we should examine the individual investment in higher education 
in a little more detail. The following is usually calculated as a rate of return to education: 
First we have to calculate the net present value of the education investment. Equation (1) is 
based on the rate of return calculation presented in Blöndal (2002). 
  (1) 
Where: 
 – Alternate cost of education (can be the rate of return to a lower level of education) 
 – The age of the individual when starting level j education, which takes l years to finish  
 – Net cost of j level education  
 – Net income advantage of the degree holder with j education over j-1 education 
 – Net annual earning with j level of education 
 – Tax rate with j level of education  
 – Rate of economic growth 
 – Money transfer after education 
 – The student loan repayment 
 – Unemployment rate in the given cohort (j education, t age) 
 – Cost of j education 
and: 
 
  
  
 
The internal rate of return of such an equation4 is called the rate of return to education. As can 
easily be seen this requires a huge amount of data. A large panel of data is needed for a long 
period of time and for different levels of education to take into account the foregone earnings. 
The foregone earnings is the  value, the earnings that would have been earned without 
obtaining a given level of education. The usual benchmark is the average earnings with 
secondary school education. This kind of calculation is costly but more meaningful when it is 
calculated for a large proportion of the population. For example, what are the rates of return in 
the Hungarian education system? It becomes more difficult when we want to calculate what 
                                                          
4 The  value that makes equation (1) zero. 
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kind of return people should expect, if they completed, for instance, their MSc degree in a 6 
semester economics program in 2007. Another methodology is based on the Mincer income 
equation which will be considered in the Results chapter of the paper.    
It is also important to take from equation (1) the fact that the rate of return is sensitive to how 
the costs are dispersed over time. Student loans can help to postpone some costs to the period 
when the benefits are realized. It is a commonly accepted fact that higher education financing 
is one of the economic markets where government is right to intervene. One of the reasons is 
that human capital cannot be a basis for a mortgage. The bearer and the human capital itself 
cannot be separated, so if a default occurs the bank cannot take it away and sell it. Because of 
this there would be a lack of financial support for those people who would want to study, and 
so government should step in as a financer or a guarantor (Stiglitz 2000). Setting up a state-
financed or stated-guaranteed student lending mechanism is one possible way, among many, 
for the government to help people to obtain degrees, and has positive external effects for the 
whole of society and can be a motor behind economic growth. In fact, aiding human capital 
investment has a positive social rate of return, because of the progressive taxation5 system (T. 
Kiss, 2010), but the social rate of return and public investment in a general sense is not the 
topic of this paper. 
The possibility to take out a loan for human capital investment is very important when we are 
discussing the topic of risk. It makes it possible to make investments today that might not be 
justified by a future income advantage. Human capital cannot serve as a mortgage, so in any 
case of default the lender cannot be compensated. So with student lending a standard annuity 
loan can be unfortunate, because in low income periods it can trigger a default6 and the lender 
will be left with a huge outstanding sum. If this occurs en masse then the student loan 
company has to default as well. A risk management option can be to set the lending scheme to 
be income-contingent. These type of loans are not like mortgages where repayment is 
unconnected to the income of the borrower. With an income contingent loan the borrowers 
pay a given share of their income (Chapman, 2006; Berlinger 2009). Theoretically, in this 
case high losses can be deterred, because there are no periods in life when the student loan 
repayment is a very high proportion of the income, or must be paid when the borrower is 
unemployed. The Hungarian student loan system is exactly like this, and the amount of 
payment is calculated from the level of income two years prior to the date the payments are 
due. 
                                                          
5This is also represented in equation (1) 
6Bear in mind that the debtor also knows that nothing can be taken away from him or her. 
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However it must be seen that serious and problematic over-investment will at some point 
cause financial turbulence under both financial schemes.  
This section has summarised what must be considered when searching for risk factors. We 
must take into account those costs of education that can be immediate and postponed. The 
postponed costs are the greater risk factors, because they are financed by future income which 
is not guaranteed. If the student loan system defaults because of the high level of individual 
defaults it can affect the higher education system itself. The current level of student numbers 
could not be financed7 by the students alone, and universities would be in need of a bail out, 
the burden of which might fall on the government. 
A modern financial market practice is securitization. Various articles (Nasser – Norman 2011) 
and scientific papers (Gillen 2008) have pointed out that even student loans were part of the 
securitization process. Securitization played a major role in creating the incentives behind the 
housing and financial bubble in the middle of the last decade. Securitization, in a nutshell, 
means that a bank issues derivatives based on their outstanding loans through financial 
intermediaries. The value of the derivatives usually derives from packages of loans. The value 
and risk of these derivatives decreased rapidly when investors realized that subprime loans 
were heavily represented in these seemingly low risk, high return portfolios (Király et al 
2008). 
Student loans were and are part of this ongoing process. The process itself is beneficial for 
every participant. Securitization can allow more lending to students and less risk for the 
lender, for example American tax-payer citizens, as this process allocates the risk to those 
who are willing to take the risk of a portfolio which includes student loans. This statement 
holds as long as student loans do not became garbage loans that default in most occasions 
without any mortgage asset to be taken. And this can indeed be the case; Macchiarola – 
Abraham (2010), for example, showed that even degrees that traditionally offered safe returns 
– like degrees in law – have lost this feature in the new economy.8 If these student loans turn 
out to be garbage loans and most of them default then this can seriously decrease the trust in 
these derivatives. These derivatives can multiply the size of a market, because a basic asset 
can be the underlying asset of several derivatives or be the beginning of a chain of derivative 
                                                          
7It is only a problem when the higher education financing system is highly reliant on private investment through 
tuition fees. 
8While mentioning this trend we should not forget the expansion of education. More colleges and universities 
appeared, offering the same qualifications but not necessarily the same quality (See for example Guri-Rosenblit 
et al 2007 on massification of education). 
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deals (Gillen 2008). The student loan market exhibits most of the symptoms of a bubble 
(Macchiarola – Abraham 2010). 
This argument is only valid if it is impossible to bail out student lenders or even the debtors. 
In the case of the housing market it was impossible to bail out every failed loan, and it was 
also impossible to bail out every bank to keep the derivatives valuable.9 But if student lenders 
remain creditworthy in spite of student loan defaults the derivatives will keep their value. 
A more worrying case can occur if the government is not flexible in bailing out. A turning 
point in the 2008 financial crisis occurred when Lehman Brothers was allowed to go bankrupt 
(Fernando et al 2012). If government action is limited then the borrowers' financial rationality 
plays a crucial role. Hungary is a good example of this. In Hungary fee-paying higher 
education is relatively new, and the system of education programs went through a dramatic 
change (Haug-Tausch 2001, Sursock-Smidt 2010). Financial responsibility might be ignored 
in such a confusing time.      
Based on the literature the following hypothesises will be examined: 
Hypothesis 1: There is an economically developed country where private investment in higher 
education is large enough compared to factors which cause regular macro cycles, such as  
financial market value or government spending.  
Hypothesis 2: There is a country where the student loan debt market (postponed costs of 
investment) is comparable to housing debt, which we know can cause a crisis. 
Hypothesis 3: There is a reason to think that the behaviour of average individuals when  
borrowing for education is not financially reasonable. 
                                                          
9Serious moral hazard issues can be discussed here, as well. 
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Data and Methodology 
The first two hypothesis will be examined through the analysis of openly available databases. 
Eurostat and OECD databases, along with Worldbank and Eurostat, offer publicly available 
aggregate data. OECD’s Education at a Glance is the largest dataset that allows international 
comparison. The necessary comparison(s) will be made. 
The third question in the last section is more complicated. As was mentioned, calculating 
NPV for large investor groups is more feasible. A very detailed example is available in 
Avery-Turner (2012). They point out that in spite of the growing costs and indebtedness, 
choosing higher education is still a rational and rewarding investment for most; however, they 
point out it is not universal and there are people who lose out.  
However it might not be surprising that US investors are more or less financially consequent 
about their investment in education. As we will see in the empirical section, the US education 
system is one of those that demand the most private investment. Their tuition fees are high 
compared to the European education systems. 
However, there are countries where the education system is in turbulent change, data 
availability is limited and the initial financial investment is low. Hungary is a prime example 
of this. During the 2000-2010 period the traditional 4 year college and 5 year university 
system was partially replaced by a 3 stage BSc-MSc-PhD system, which was supplemented 
by 2-year vocational training. This was called the Bologna process (Haug-Tausch 2001, 
Sursock-Smidt 2010). The Hungarian Higher education system offers full time training and 
part time training as well. The education programs are available in state-funded form; 
however, if one studies for a second degree at a given level or cannot reach the minimum 
entry criteria10 then one can participate in the same education programs making a cost 
contribution or paying a tuition fee11. Even when a full cost contribution is necessary it is 
mostly around 500-1000 EUR per semester (Stéger-Szövenyi (ed.) 2013). Most recently, 77% 
percent of students taken on by the system have been in state-funded programs.12 Those who 
apply for higher education can choose a wide variety of education programs, from 2 year 
programs to even 6 year programs. Many of these programs are fairly new and were 
introduced by the Bologna-process. Most of the applicants have access to state-financed 
                                                          
10This is based on the applicants’ secondary school performance, final exam grades, and in some cases entry 
exams taken for the higher education institute.   
11Even these education programs have minimum entry criteria, but these are lower than state-financed programs.  
12http://www.felvi.hu/felveteli/ponthatarok_rangsorok/friss_statisztikak/!FrissStatisztikak/friss_statisztikak.php?
stat=1 
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programs. It is very difficult to make decisions in this environment because of the lack of 
information about the market value of these new types of degrees. Financial rationality is the 
least expected in such an environment.     
For our purposes, Christiansen et al (2006) can be a very useful methodological guide. They 
used financial economic techniques to better understand the risk-return trade off. They used a 
standard mean-variance analysis, very similar to the analysis of the fundamental problems of 
finance. 
The original analysis was for risky security investments like shares, bonds or derivatives. 
They assumed that the available investment possibilities are different kinds of education 
degrees. The Markowitz theory assumes rational investors invest in efficient portfolios. A 
portfolio of investments is efficient if it offers the least risk for a given level of return or the 
most return on a given level of risk. A set of portfolios fulfils these two requirements at the 
same time. This set is called the efficient frontier. The efficient frontier is part of a parabola in 
a mean-variance space, but it is more common to graph it in the mean-standard deviation 
space, where the frontier is a hyperbola (Merton 1972). It is illustrated on Graph 1. 
Nowadays this is included in almost every financial textbook. Merton (1972) derived 
Equation (2) for the efficient frontier13. 
    (2) 
Where: 
 – Variance of the portfolio return 
 – Expected return of the portfolio. 
 
Graph 1 shows the image of the efficient frontier in the mean-variance space. The bold part of 
the line represents the efficient portfolios. Portfolios outside the line cannot be realized and 
portfolios within the line are not mean-variance optimal. The non-optimal part of the frontier 
offers minimum variance for a given level of return, but not the maximum return for the given 
level of risk. 
Christiansen et al (2006) suggest considering an education program as a portfolio of human 
capital investments. Different education programs offer different enhancements of skills and 
knowledge. The assumption is that a human capital investor would prefer one education 
                                                          
13  You can also find this in the Hungarian literature in Gáll József – Pap Gyula (2010). 
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program over another if it offers the highest return on a given risk level or the lowest risk on a 
given return level14. 
Christiansen et al (2006) finds that some types of higher education degree fit this model, but 
there are some that do not fit. Some programs, for instance humanities, arts or nursing, do not 
offer a higher return for more variance, but there are still people who hold these degrees and 
choose these professions. These programs are not on the efficient frontier but within it. Even 
the authors point out that some assumptions of the original model probably do not hold for the 
higher education market. The basic assumption of the theory is that students choose their 
profession based on risk-return reasoning. This is more likely to be true for securities, but for 
professions it is not that likely. 
We will make a similar examination of a data sample from the Student Loan Centre of 
Hungary. This is not a public database, but no data was provided to me or any of my 
colleagues that has any reference to the borrowers’ identities. Neither do my results have any 
relation to the business policy or profitability of the Student Loan Centre. 
The data sample is for yearly annual gross real income from 2008 to 2012.15 The Hungarian 
student loan scheme is income contingent. They receive income data in order to calculate the 
necessary payment16. The payment can be 6% or 8% of the income two years prior to the due 
date of the payment. The first two years payment is based on the minimum-wage.  
Individuals entered the sample if they had recorded income for any of the years in the 
indicated time period. The focus of the examination is education programs. Those programs 
were selected where at least 30 individuals' income was recorded for the whole time period. 
Only state financed and full time education programs were evaluated. Those who participated 
in more than one type of education program were excluded, as well as those who had no 
reported income17. The equal costs assumption does not apply for those who participated in 
several different ISCED coded programs. The final sample contained data for 20,146 
individuals in 46,229 observations for 34 education programs. The data for the education 
programs are available in Table 2 of the supplement. To conclude this section, the questions 
imposed by the literature will be answered by the following way: 
o The country with the largest private investment in education will be found. 
                                                          
14The financial portfolio theory asks what the optimal investment is if we have a given budget X. X is 
completely devoted to risky investment. If we apply this theory to education programs we must assume that 
every education program requires that we invest the same budget. This issue will be discussed in a later part of 
the paper. 
15The price indices of KSH (2014) were used for real income calculations. The previous year is 100. Year/Price 
Index: 2009/104,2; 2010/104,9; 2011/103,9; 2012/105,7  
16Their data is from the Hungarian Tax Authority 
17See Supplement 4 for more on the decision to exclude observations with 0 income 
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o Its investment will be compared to other macroeconomic factors. If they are found to 
be relatively small, then Hypotheses 1 and 2 will be rejected. 
o We fit Equation 2 to a Hungarian dataset. If the model has strong explanatory power 
then Hypothesis 3 will be rejected.   
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Empirical results 
First we look for countries where private investment in higher education can be a major 
macroeconomic factor. These countries should have a high investment in higher education 
and a large private investment as well. The first factor – high investment – is indicated in this 
paper by total spending on tertiary education per student. The second factor – private 
investment – is indicated by household spending, which is calculated from the ratio of 
household spending to total spending and the total spending value itself. In a country where 
higher education can be a risk factor many people should have invested in higher education. 
In Graph 2 the population with a tertiary level of education measures this. The 25-34 year old 
cohort is represented, because it is the closest to the micro sample that will be discussed 
later18, and because they might be the most interesting cohort in terms of future economic 
tendencies. Those countries are highlighted where total investment per student is high, as well 
as private investment, and a large portion of the population is involved in higher education.  
The USA stands out as the largest circle with around 11,000 dollars spent per student from the 
household budget annually. Japan and the UK follow. Canada can be a major market if we 
look at total spending, but private spending is not that high. Tuition fees in Canada are lower. 
Canada and Korea are also taken for further examination based on the extensive involvement 
of the population. In Japan, Canada and Korea more than 50% of the age cohort obtain some 
kind of degree from the tertiary education. If we consider the other countries20 it can be noted 
that education expenditure can be high but does not depend on household investment.21 For 
the average citizen in most of the OECD countries, choosing higher education has no greater 
financial risk then buying a new TV or a notebook computer. Data for the countries are 
available in Supplement 1.  
With Graph 2 we can identify mainly the United States, Canada, United Kingdom, Australia, 
Japan and Korea as the countries where private financing can be a major economic factor. To 
decide whether it is or not, the total tertiary education spending (both private and public 
together) should be compared to the size of various major factors such as total government 
spending, total government debt, total household debt and the size of the stock market. 
Graph 3 shows that the total spending – private and public as well – are so small compared to 
major economic factors such as government and household indebtedness, government social 
                                                          
18See Supplement 3 
20Unnamed grey circles 
21Chile is an interesting exception, but in Chile the total spending is much lower.  
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spending or the size of the stock market companies that it is condensed almost to a dot in the 
middle of the graph. The total spending on higher education is between 1 and 2.5% of the 
annual product whereas the social spending is around 20%, the stock market size is around 
100% with large differences, and the debt statistics are even larger22. If we made an 
intertemporal comparison, we would find that a regular variance, for example in government 
debt, can cover the whole of higher education spending. This shows that in extreme cases the 
government has the ability to intervene in a smaller market such as higher education or the 
student loan debt market with a regular government bond issue. 
In Graph 2 the United States stands out as the country with the largest higher education 
market. However, if we compare the compiled student loan with the total household debt we 
see that the share of student loans in the total level of debt has risen from 1% to 9% during the 
last decade, but it is still small compared to mortgage loans. When the total student loan debt 
hit the 1 trillion dollar mark in the United States there was intense debate in the press over 
whether student loan will be the next financial bubble, as was mentioned earlier. However, 
when we look at Graph 3 then it can be seen that even in the United States, where the tuition 
fees are the highest and the student lending has the longest tradition, only 9% of household 
debt is made up of student loans.  
These loans are mostly federal loans, as can be seen on Graph 5. In the 2012-2013 educational 
year 110 billion dollars were lent, but only 8% of this was non-federal. Non-federal loans are 
not necessarily private loans; they include loans to students from US states and from 
institutions, in addition to private loans issued by banks, credit unions, and Sallie Mae 
(CollegeBoard, 2013).  The main income of the state is not the repayment and the interest on 
these loans. The mortgage outstanding is in the balance sheet of private companies such as 
commercial and investment banks. The current tendency would have to continue for at least 2 
decades (i.e. student loans should reach 30%) to become a major macroeconomic risk factor. 
So we can conclude that the student loan market and higher education spending are small in 
comparison with the markets that economic analysts pay most attention to when trying to 
assess the possibility of an economic downturn.    
Based on Graph 2 and Graph 3 we can reject Hypothesis 1 and 2. The next task is to evaluate 
Hypothesis 3 by testing Equation 2. 
The first step is to fit Equation 2 to the data, but a return measure must be defined. 
Christiansen et al (2006) will be followed. Two types of return will be calculated: raw 
                                                          
22Although we compare here various stock and flow variables, again we emphasise this to show the size 
differences, which is the real purpose behind the comparison. 
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logarithmic income and Mincer residuals. The first is calculated by Equation 3. The expected 
row logarithmic income of an education group is the average of the time average of the 
individual income. This means we evaluate a high salary as the return to education. 
   (3) 
 – Expected return (row logarithmic income) for the education group j 
 – Number of individuals in education group j 
 – Number of observations for an individual i 
 – Annual income for individual i in education group j in year t.  
It can be argued that raw logarithmic income is not the actual rate of return because costs and 
foregone earnings are not represented. As was mentioned earlier the education programs are 
state-financed, so the tuition fee does not vary by education group. If equal living and 
travelling costs and the same foregone earnings for different education groups are assumed, 
then the only variable dependent on the education group in the rate of return calculation is the 
income23. It should also be assumed that income differences between the professions are more 
or less constant over time, or that the investors do not have better predictions than this 
assumption. It is essential to assume equal costs because the portfolio theory we are building 
upon asks how the budget X should be spent.  
The second type of return we will calculate is the Mincer residuals, but first the Mincer 
equation should be introduced. As was expressed in the literature review chapter the rate of 
return calculation is very data hungry. Mincer (1958) introduced a very simple approach for 
the rate of return to education. The so called Mincer equation can be expressed in the form of 
Equation 4. 
   (4) 
 – Years of schooling for individual i 
 – Experience of individual i  
It can be shown that, if certain conditions are met, the coefficient of schooling ( ) in the 
Mincer-equation (Eq. 4) is the rate of return to education (Hackman et al, 2005). The second 
return measure will be the expected residual of the Mincer equation for an education group. 
The individual Mincer residual is defined in Equation 5.  
   (5) 
                                                          
23 In this paper there will be no emphasis on whether the industry the individual is working in is the same as the 
one she studied for. Job-matching is an existing dilemma, but we have no data to examine such a question.    
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 – Mincer residual 
The Mincer residual can be understood as a redefinition of foregone earnings because it 
compares the earnings to the expected earnings with the same years of schooling. It asks 
whether the individual with a given education can earn more than what is expected purely on 
her years of education and experience. A Mincer residual for education group j can be 
obtained by substituting  in Equation 3 in the place of . 
Risk will be measured by the average standard deviation for an education group for both 
return measures. This is formulated by Equation 6 
   (6) 
Where: 
 – Expected logarithmic income for individual i in education group j 
 – Etandard deviation of return for education group j 
Similarly to Equation 6, the standard deviation of the Mincer residual can be defined by 
substituting  into Equation 6 in the place of  and  in the place of .  is the 
expected Mincer residual of the individual i. 
Graph 6 shows the 34 educational groups in the mean-variance space, where the raw 
logarithmic income is the return and its standard deviation is indicated on the horizontal axis.  
If we examine the scatterplot in more detail the hyperbolic shape indicated by the theory can 
be seen. It can be noticed that MSc Social Sciences and Law and MSc Engineering24 offer the 
highest return. It is also notable that MSc programs appear to stand out. Traditional college 
(TC) and some BSc studies, such as Humanities and Art25 are more mixed around the top of 
the hyperbola. Vocational training courses26 (VT) lie along a part of the frontier that is not 
optimal according to the theory because higher return-less risk combinations can be found. 
They are optimal only according to one criteria, by offering the minimum of risk for the given 
level of return. The opinion of the author is that there can be several explanations for this. 
There can be some kind of human capital or financial barrier that does not allow individuals 
to choose longer education programs with favourable risk-return combinations. For instance, 
MSc Health is one of the best combinations in a risk-return sense. The theory would claim 
that people must prefer MSc Health over BSc Health or VT in Health Sciences. However the 
fact is that these programs exist, so this might suggest that, for example, somebody who 
                                                          
24ISCED code 3 and 5 with 17 years of total education 
25ISCED code 2 with 15 years of total education 
2614 years of total education 
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studies to be a nurse does not have the human capital requirements to be a surgeon27. Another 
possibility is that foregone earnings might cause different levels of stress for different 
individuals. For example, someone might not able to choose to stay out of the labour market 
for the extended time that a BSc+MSc combination demands, even if it is financially feasible 
by taking out a student loan.28 
Another possible explanation is that most of these training courses are not the complete 
education investment people are planning to make, but simply the entry level for a higher 
level education. For instance, someone who does a BSc in Engineering is very likely to return 
for an MSc after a few years of work. Some of this theory would be testable by a thorough 
examination of the more interesting cases through primary data collection.  
As can be seen in Table 1, which contains the results appropriate for Equation 2, the 
coefficients are significant on all usual significance levels, moreover the sign of the 
coefficients are those that Equation 2 predicted. The R2 statistic is quite high at 0.795. Most of 
the variance can be explained by the model. Table 1 suggests that the education programs fit 
to a model that is based on rational risk-minimalizing behaviour. For some reason, some of 
the education programs are non-optimal, because higher returns can be reached through 
longer education programs with the same level of risk. As was mentioned previously, there 
may be various non-financial barriers for some investors. Compared to the results of 
Christiansen et al (2006) they found more education programs that seemingly do not fit to the 
model. Some of their findings are inside the efficient frontier. 
We introduced Mincer residuals as well29. If the same analysis is made, the education 
programs can be visualized in Graph 7. 
Graph 7 offers the interesting suggestion that those who finished higher education after a 
Vocational training course tend to underperform compared to the Mincer-model prediction. 
BSc programs are spread widely, and MSc and Traditional 4 year college programs are 
concentrated more narrowly around the 0 line. This seems to suggest that the Mincer 
predictions might be better for longer education programs. This might be a convincing 
argument if we assume that education needs an extended period to make an impact on future 
productivity.30 
                                                          
27If the sample included secondary education grades or IQ test results, then this theory would be testable. 
28This theory would be testable if family income background were available  
29The results for the Mincer-model are in the supplement 
30Or it might suggest some kind of counter-signalling behaviour, but this would lead us away from the human 
capital theory. For more on counter-signalling see Feltovich et al. (2001). 
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Table 2 summarizes the results used to fit Equation 2 to the data of Graph 2. The P-values 
suggest that the coefficients of the Mincer residual are not significant on the usual 
significance levels, but the squared residual is significant at 1% and the R2 is 52.6%, so the 
model should not be rejected; however, this model does not fit as well as the previous one. 
The worse performance of the Mincer residual was observed by Christiansen et al (2006), as 
well. This may suggest that individual earnings and their security play a greater role in the 
choice of education than the comparative wage advantage over those who have the same level 
of education. We must also note that the Mincer model does not fit our data very well31. If it 
were possible to include more information on, for instance, family background, this might 
prove the explanatory power of Mincer-residual based model, as well. So the weak 
explanatory power of this model might be caused by a wrong prediction of the benchmark for 
wage advantage. 
The connection between risk and return suggested by Graph 6 and Table 1 makes an 
interesting addition to the argument set out in Anderberg – Andersson (2003); da Costa – 
Maestri (2007); Anderberg (2009) and Jacobs et al (2009). It implies that education has an 
insurance effect up to a point. This is the minimum point of the mean-variance parabola 
estimated in Table 1. However, we should not immediately call for subsidization, because the 
lack of finance is not necessarily the reason behind non-optimal investment, as it was 
suggested earlier. 
In this section we found some candidates for places where a drastic change in private 
spending on higher education or repayments of student loans can threaten the macroeconomic 
balance. It was shown that even in the United States student loan debt is not nearly as 
significant as mortgage loans. Student loans are on the state balance sheet, not on that of 
private companies. A sudden stop in the flow of private investment does not threaten the 
financing of higher education, because the state plays a major role in this as well.  
Some can argue that there are places where the government might not be powerful enough 
even to react to a smaller crisis in student lending and higher education financing. We have 
provided evidence that even in Hungary, where a lot of students participate in state-funded 
programs, those who borrowed money for education in a complex and dynamically changing 
environment were still rational. The typical patterns of a financially rational choice of 
education programs can be found. 
                                                          
31See Supplement 2 
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The combination of a relatively small market and financially rational behaviour suggest that 
the risk of macroeconomic crisis caused by a student loan market bubble is quiet small. 
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Conclusion 
This paper tested three hypotheses introduced after a short literature review. It was stated that 
1) there is an economically developed country where private investment in higher education is 
large enough compared to factors which cause regular macro cycles such as financial market 
value or government spending; 2) there is a country where the student loan debt market (the 
postponed costs of investment) is comparable to housing debt, which we know can cause a 
crisis; and 3) there is a reason to think that the behaviour of the average individual who 
borrows for education is not financially reasonable. First the education investment data of the 
OECD was examined and there were 6 countries which stood out where private investment in 
education plays major role, and higher education expenditure is high in global comparison. 
These are the United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, Australia, Japan and Korea. Based 
on Worldbank data, none of the above mentioned countries spends so much on higher 
education that it can be compared to the size of the financial market, or international debt 
markets. When different categories of the indebtedness of US households were compared it 
was found that student loan debt only accounts for 9% of the total indebtedness, and this is 
small compared to mortgage loans. This debt is owed to the central budget of the United 
States, as only 8% of the loans are non-federal. 
When financial rationality was examined, a Hungarian borrower sample was chosen, because 
the Hungarian higher education culture has less experience in student loan financing and there 
were many new type of programs, with little labour feedback at the time of decision making. 
The sample included student loan borrowers, who participated in state-funded, full-time 
education programs. During the analysis the methodology of Christiansen et al (2006) was 
used. Two types of return, and their variance as risk measures were examined. The risk-return 
trade-off predicted by the financial theory of portfolio investments could be traced back. 
Based on this result, we stated that financial rationality is true for human capital investors 
even in a dynamically changing environment. There were education programs that fitted at the 
non-optimal part of the efficient frontier. Various possible explanations were mentioned for 
these very interesting cases, and they can be interesting topics for further research. If there are 
short term education programs on the non-optimal part of the efficient frontier, more studies 
could act as an insurance, but after the minimal variance point education is a risky investment. 
Interestingly, in the argument set out in the literature review it might be possible that both 
sides are right.    
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Tables and graphs 
 
Graph 1: Efficient frontier 
 
Source: Illustration 
 
Graph 2: Population with a tertiary level of education, 25-34 years old, % in same age group 
(horizontal axis); Total spending on tertiary education, US dollars/student (vertical axis); 
Household spending on tertiary education, US dollars/student, calculated32 (size) 
 
Source: OECD, Education at Glance (2013) 
                                                          
32  Total spending multiplied by the ratio of household spending and total spending 
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Graph 3: Total government spending, total government debt, total household debt and the size 
of the stock market 
 
Source: Worldbank (2013), Eurostat (2013) 
 
Graph 4: Debt balance of households of the United States, 2003-2013 
 
Source: nyfed.org (2013) 
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Graph 5: Growth of Federal and Non-federal Loan Dollars in 2012 Dollars, 1992-93 to 2012-13 
 
 
Source: CollegeBoard (2013)  
 
Graph 6: Scatter-plot of Raw Logarithmic Income and its standard deviation  
 
Source: Student Loan Centre Data 
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Graph 7: Scatter-plot of Mincer Residuals and their standard deviations 
  
Source: Student Loan Centre Data 
 
Table 1: Estimation of Equation 2 
 Estimate Std. Error t value P value 
Intercept 77.91218 11.25213 6.924 9.13e-08 
(Row Log Income)2 0.37754 0.05685 6.641 2.01e-07 
Row Log Income -10.84048 1.59992 -6.776 1.38e-07 
R2 0.7908    
N 34    
 
Table 2: Estimation of Equation 2 
 Estimate Std. Error t value P value 
Intercept 0.09218 0.01427 6.460 3.34e-07 
(Mincer residual)2 0.52903 0.16469 3.212 0.00307 
Mincer residual -0.06042 0.06063 -0.997 0.32668 
R2 0.5258    
N 34    
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Supplement  
Supplement 1: Data for Graph 3 
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United States 0.4313 25575.89 11586 
United Kingdom 0.4691 15862.3 9211 
Japan 0.587 16014.84 8116 
Australia 0.4461 15142 5925 
Korea 0.6382 9971.53 4901 
Chile 0.413 7100 4836 
Canada 0.567 22475 4542 
New Zealand 0.4604 10418.08 3343 
Israel 0.4504 10729.74 2926 
Netherlands 0.399 17161.34 2560 
Mexico 0.2254 7872.39 2436 
Portugal 0.269 10578.47 2358 
Italy 0.2098 9579.76 2281 
Spain 0.3915 13373.27 2244 
Ireland 0.4719 16007.62 2207 
Poland 0.392 8865.86 2019 
Russian Federation 0.565 7039.31 1930 
Germany 0.2767 15711 1854 
Sweden 0.4286 19562.11 1839 
France 0.4301 15067.12 1460 
Estonia 0.3905 6500.85 1183 
Slovenia 0.3381 9692.92 1043 
Denmark 0.3858 18976.9 949 
Belgium 0.4245 15178 832 
Slovak Republic 0.2566 6903.67 805 
Czech Republic 0.2513 7635 669 
Finland 0.3937 16713.87 669 
Iceland 0.3937 8727.82 641 
Norway 0.468 18511.67 562 
Austria 0.2116 15007 435 
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Supplement 2: Data for the Education programs 
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1 VT Humanities and Art 14.33 0.28 0.20 0.28 74 36 14 
2 VT Social 13.83 0.38 -0.28 0.37 1963 902 14 
3 VT Natural 13.79 0.39 -0.34 0.39 277 127 14 
4 VT Engineering 14.18 0.35 -0.04 0.37 146 61 14 
5 VT Health 13.25 0.84 -0.63 0.76 90 42 14 
6 VT Services 13.68 0.41 -0.41 0.42 867 405 14 
7 BSc Education 14.09 0.30 -0.26 0.33 533 208 15 
8 BSc Humanities and Art 13.41 0.56 -0.57 0.53 124 69 15 
9 BSc Social 14.38 0.36 0.08 0.35 1817 746 15 
10 BSc Natural 14.41 0.30 0.13 0.30 1653 712 15 
11 BSc Engineering 14.47 0.30 0.17 0.31 3421 1455 15 
12 BSc Agricultural 14.13 0.35 -0.22 0.34 432 177 15 
13 BSc Health 13.94 0.47 -0.28 0.47 93 41 15 
14 BSc Services 14.63 0.27 0.34 0.27 757 338 15 
15 BSc Social 14.61 0.31 0.30 0.31 4750 2061 15.5 
16 BSc Natural 14.56 0.32 0.22 0.33 577 233 15.5 
17 BSc Engineering 13.96 0.48 -0.17 0.43 859 416 15.5 
18 BSc Services 14.03 0.35 -0.13 0.34 196 100 15.5 
19 TC Education 14.01 0.37 -0.41 0.38 3028 1309 16 
20 TC Humanities and Art 14.06 0.41 -0.35 0.41 830 360 16 
21 TC Social 14.42 0.31 -0.02 0.32 1323 577 16 
22 TC Natural 14.36 0.29 -0.12 0.32 175 70 16 
23 TC Engineering 14.56 0.21 0.14 0.26 181 90 16 
24 TC Health 14.11 0.37 -0.33 0.36 1820 788 16 
25 TC Services 14.38 0.36 -0.05 0.36 1518 659 16 
26 MSc Education 14.02 0.34 -0.46 0.32 503 226 17 
27 MSc Humanities and Art 14.08 0.41 -0.46 0.41 2376 1071 17 
28 MSc Social 14.67 0.34 0.11 0.32 7218 3090 17 
29 MSc Natural 14.55 0.37 0.06 0.37 2474 1102 17 
30 MSc Engineering 14.68 0.36 0.17 0.35 3123 1346 17 
31 MSc Agricultural 14.12 0.39 -0.45 0.38 764 330 17 
32 MSc Health 14.54 0.35 0.03 0.33 579 262 17 
33 MSc Services 14.44 0.38 -0.13 0.37 607 254 17 
34 MSc Health 14.57 0.39 -0.12 0.39 1081 483 18 
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Supplement 3: Summary of the Mincer-equation 
The results for Equation 4 are presented in the following table. The coefficients are 
significant, but the explanatory power of the model is very weak. Experience is calculated 
from the beginning of the loan repayment. The average experience is 2.74 years, so subjects 
are from the 25-34 age cohort, which was used in the international comparison. This does not 
necessarily correspond to work experience, but this is the best approximation that can be 
made on the available dataset. It is worth pointing out that the rate of return is 13.6%, which is 
a very plausible result. 
 
 Estimate Std. Error t value P value 
Intercept 11.656059 0.067222 173.40 <2e-16 *** 
Years of schooling 0.136602 0.004146 32.94 <2e-16 *** 
Experience 0.401274 0.007101 56.51 <2e-16 *** 
(Experience)2 -0.046715 0.001115 -41.91 <2e-16 *** 
R2 0.1009    
N 46229    
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Supplement 4 
The Student Loan Centre receives its income information for the repayment calculations from 
the tax authority (Nemzeti Adó és Vámhivatal33). However, if an individual has not prepared 
a tax return, this means he or she has 0 taxable income in Hungary. Many of the clients of 
who pay back their loan belong in this category. In fact, 14.37% was the average 0 income 
ratio34 among the 34 education groups. There can be several reasons for this phenomenon, 
including the following: 
o The borrower is inactive and does not receive any financial assistance, but uses his 
savings for repayment 
o The borrower is inactive and does not receive any financial assistance, but the family 
or relatives repay 
o The borrower works abroad and does a tax return there 
o The borrower has income but does not report it.  
The reasons for inactivity can be several; for instance, an individual graduates, but starts the 
repayment, or waits for better job opportunities, and in some cases it can be that they do not 
work because they are unable to. Interestingly, as Table 3 suggests, there is a strong negative 
linear connection between the raw log income of the education group and the ratio of 0 
income. This suggests that 0 income is more of a decision than a risk. The option value of 
education is a rich field in educational economics as well (Eide – Waehrer 1998). 0 income 
can be an unexercised option if it is not the product of foreign earnings. Working abroad is 
very popular among young graduates35. The correlation between years of education and the 0 
income ratio is -0.18, which means they might be independent, but unemployment and the 
length of education usually shows a strong relationship. As Graph 8 suggests, there is no 
connection between the type of education and the 0 income ratio, except maybe that for 
ISCED type 2, i.e. humanities and arts, where it is higher than for ISCED type 3, i.e. social 
sciences and arts.  
Based on the fact that 0 income does not necessarily mean unemployment or inactivity 
because of inability to work, it appears preferable to clear the sample from the 0 income data, 
because it might cause less distortion to leave out some unintentionally unemployed workers 
than to hugely overestimate the risk and underestimate the return by retaining a lot of the 0 
                                                          
33National Tax and Customs Administration of Hungary (NTCA) 
34The number of 0 income observations was compared to the total number of observations 
35See for example the following article: 
http://eduline.hu/felnottkepzes/2014/2/7/A_BGFes_friss_diplomasok_harmada_tervez_kul_E18VDA 
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incomes of those who might have an income or still be studying. All the further calculations 
are for non-zero income individuals.  
 
Table 5: Connection between Raw Logarithmic Income and the Ratio of 0 income 
observations 
 Estimate Std. Error t value P value 
Intercept 1.80375 0.24337 7.412 1.97e-08 
(Mincer residual)2 -0.11680 0.01712 -6.823 1.02e-07 
R2 0.5258    
N 34    
     
Graph 8: Boxplot of the 0 income ratio by ISCED categories 
 
